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Abstract: This paper analyzes the political support for public insurance in
the presence of a private insurance alternative. The public insurance is com-
pulsory and oﬀers a uniform insurance policy. The private insurance is volun-
tary and can oﬀer diﬀerent insurance policies. Adopting Yaari￿s (1987) dual
theory to expected utility (i.e., risk aversion without diminishing marginal
utility of income), we show that adverse selection on the private insurance
market may lead a majority of individuals to prefer public insurance over
private insurance, even if the median risk is below the average risk (so that
the median actually subsidizes high-risk individuals). We also show that risk
aversion makes public insurance more attractive and that the dual theory is
less favourable to a mixed insurance system than the expected utility frame-
work. Lastly, we demonstrate how the use of genetic tests may threaten the
political viability of public insurance.
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This paper is concerned with the political demand for public insurance when
there exist private insurance alternatives. We focus attention on the insur-
ance against the risk of incurring a damage, and to keep the argument clear,
we abstract from the possible redistributive element in public insurance.1
To separate redistribution from insurance arguments, we assume that indi-
viduals diﬀer only with respect to their risk (or probability of incurring a
damage) without distinguishing the nature of the risk. Therefore we can
interpret the analysis among other as regarding the provision of health care
insurance when individuals diﬀer in their health status, or the provision of
pension annuities when individuals diﬀer in their life expectancy.
There is strong evidence that in the OECD countries the public sector plays
an important role in the provision of insurance for health care (see OECD,
1994)2, and that the retired depend largely on state pensions (Miles and Tim-
mermann, 1999). In most European countries, state pensions are typically
50-80 percent of average earnings. The essential distinction we make between
private insurance and public insurance is that private insurance is voluntary
and can oﬀer diﬀerent insurance policies (essentially, premia and coverage
rates) to diﬀerent individuals while public insurance is compulsory and of-
fer the same insurance contract to everyone. There are two good reasons
why public insurance is compulsory. First, to overcome the adverse selection
problem which induces the good risks to opt out increasing the average cost
1We can motivate this assumption on the basis of recent empirical work by Lynn
Coronado and al (2000) showing that social security has negligible distributive eﬀects.
2More recently, the Economist (July 16th 2001) reports a study by the OECD ac-
cording to which in 1998 Germany spent 10% of GDP on health, France spent 9.5%, the
Netherlands spent 8.7%, Italy spent 8.2%, Austria spent 8% and Britain spent just 6.8%.
Most-but not all- of health spendings were accounted for by the state: Germany spent 8%,
France 8.5%, the Netherlands 6%, Italy 5.5%, Austria 5.8% and Britain 5.7%.
1of insurance. Second, to avoid the so-called Samaritan￿s dilemma problem
according to which if individuals anticipate that the government will provide
them with insurance whether or not they insure, this will undermine their
incentive to buy insurance.
Focusing on the pure insurance element, we derive the majority rule equi-
librium between private and public insurance. We use the Rothschild and
Stiglitz (1976) model that we adapt to a continuum of risk types and non-
expected utility framework (i.e., risk aversion without diminishing marginal
utility of income). We proceed in two steps. First we derive the political equi-
librium outcome when individuals must choose between a public insurance
or a private insurance as exclusive to each other (both involving complete
coverage). We obtain the result that for a large family of distributions of
risks in the population, a majority will prefer public insurance over private
insurance, and that the size of this majority is increasing with risk aversion.
In that sense no distributive argument is required to justify the provision
of public insurance. In a second step, we consider the possibility for indi-
viduals to supplement a (basic) public insurance with a private insurance
and individuals can vote over the degree of public insurance. The main re-
sult we obtain is that for any distribution of risk in the population, mixing
public with private insurance is politically non sustainable in the sense that
there is always a majority that would like to push this supplementary sys-
tem towards either a pure public insurance or a full private insurance. This
political impossibility of mixing public with private insurance may seem to
contradict the well-known argument that it is always desirable to have some
public insurance because it operates a cross-subsidy from low-risk to high-
risk individuals which is bene￿cial to both types in relaxing the incentive
compatibility constraint on the private insurance market (see Mas-colell and
al., 1995, p.459; or Eckstein and al., 1985). While this result is correct in the
expected utility setting, our result simply shows that it does not extend to
2our non-expected utility model.
This paper belongs to recent theoretical work on the politics of publicly
provided private goods (see, among others, Gouveia, 1995, and Epple and
Romano, 1996). However the models used are diﬀerent as well as the results.
For instance this literature adopts the expected utility approach and typi-
cally obtains a majority equilibrium involving a mixture of private and public
insurance. We may also get a majority support for a mixed system within
our non-expected utility framework but by assuming that public insurance is
distortionary and that the deadweight loss increases suﬃciently rapidly with
the level of public insurance (see Appendix B).
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 deals with voting over exclu-
sive private and public insurance when the private market can only oﬀer a
pooling contract. Section 3 introduces the possibility for the private market
to oﬀer diﬀerent contracts to diﬀerent individuals. Section 4 presents the
case where individuals can supplement public insurance with a separating
insurance contract and individuals must vote over the degree of public insur-
ance. Section 5 investigates how the demand for public insurance changes
when the private insurance companies can use some tests that help them to
infer, at least partially, individual risks. Section 6 concludes the paper.
2 Private insurance without screening
We use a simple model from Hindriks and Myles (Chapter 12, forthcoming).
We consider that there is a large number of risk neutral insurance companies
and that the insurance market is competitive. The insurance premium is
based on the level of expected risk (no screening) among those who accept
insurance oﬀers (voluntary insurance). Competition ensures that pro￿ts are
3zero in equilibrium through entry and exit. That is, if there is any new in-
surance contract that can make a positive pro￿t given the contracts already
available, then one of the companies will choose to oﬀer it.
The demand for insurance comes from a large set of risk averse indi-
viduals. These can be broken down into a continuum of diﬀerent types of
individuals who diﬀer in their probability of incurring (￿xed) damage of (uni-
form) value d =1 .3 The probability of damage for an individual is given by θ.
Diﬀerent types of individuals have diﬀerent values of θ lying between 0 and Θ
(with Θ < 1). There is no moral hazard since individuals cannot aﬀect their
probability of accident which is ￿xed and since the damage is also ￿xed there
is no agency cost related to the fact that for example in health care provision
the prescribing agents may have an incentive to prescribe treatment beyond
what is necessary for the insured and uninformed patients.4 However adverse
selection is introduced by assuming that each individual knows their own risk
(i.e. value of θ) but that it is not observable by the insurance companies. The
insurance companies know correctly that risks are distributed in the popula-
tion on the interval [0,Θ] according to the cumulative distribution function
F(θ).S oF(θ) is the fraction of the population with probability of accident
less or equal to θ.T h e mean risk is θ =
R Θ
0 θdF(θ) and the median risk is
θm = F−1(1/2). We allow both for positively skewed (θm < θ), symmetric
(θm = θ) and negatively skewed (θm > θ) distributions.
Since all of the individuals are risk averse, they are willing to pay an insur-
ance premium in excess of their expected damage to avoid facing the cost of
damage. The reservation premium that each type θ is willing to pay for a
3The current cost escalation in health care can be represented by an increase in d which
is easily seen to have no eﬀect on the relative desirability of public and private insurance
4Moral hazard and agency cost are assumed away because they aﬀect private and public
insurance in the same way and so they should not in￿uence the choice between the two
systems.
4coverage rate δ ∈ [0,1] of a damage d =1is given by
π(θ)=( 1+α)θδ, (1)
where α ≥ 0 measures the degree of risk aversion. In Appendix A we show
how this reservation premium can be rationalized under Yaari￿s Dual Theory
of choice under uncertainty. The dual theory has the property that utility is
linear in income, and risk aversion is expressed entirely by a transformation of
probabilities in which bad outcomes are given relatively higher weights and
good outcomes are given relatively lower weights. In our simple two-state
model the probability θ of bad outcome is weighted up by the loading factor
(1 + α) to give (1 + α)θ > θ. To guarantee that this weighted probability
is less than 1 for all types θ ∈ [0,Θ], it is assumed that α ≤ 1−Θ
Θ .A s
we shall see this formulation of risk aversion without diminishing marginal
utility allows the derivation of a rich set of insights. Although most of the
classical results in insurance theory appear to be robust to such departures
from the expected utility model, one important implication to the demand of
insurance deserves to be emphasized and will play a major role in the rest of
the analysis: under the dual theory a risk averse individual will either buy full
insurance or no insurance (corner solutions) whereas under expected utility
a risk averse individual will always buy partial insurance, unless insurance is
actuarially fair.5 It would be absurd to suggest that the dual theory provides
a better model than the expected utility. The latter has obvious appeal
and has provided so many useful results in insurance theory. Nonetheless,
we feel there is some gain from studying the properties of our simple non-
expected utility model, even if only to derive some clear insights on the
political demand for public insurance and the desirability of a mixed system.
5An analysis of the eﬀect of non-expected utility models on standard optimal insurance
results appears in Doherty and Eeckhoudt (1995) and Machina (1995).
5The assumption of competitive insurance market implies that in equilib-
rium insurance companies must earn zero pro￿ts. Now assume that insurance
companies just oﬀer a single insurance policy to all customers. (We intro-
duce the possibility of screening through a menu of insurance policies in the
next section.) Given the premium π the policy will be purchased by all the
individuals whose expected value of damage is greater than or equal to this.
That is, an individual will purchase the policy if π(θ) ≥ π which using (1) is
equivalent to θ ≥ π
1+α. Thus to break even with zero pro￿ts, the premium
must just equal the expected damage for those who choose to purchase the
policy. Formally,
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Let π∗ be the corresponding equilibrium premium. This equilibrium is il-
lustrated in Figure 1 for the uniform distribution of risks.6 It occurs where
the curve E(θ : π(θ) ≥ π) crosses the 45◦ line. The slope of the curve
E(θ : π(θ) ≥ π) is inversely proportional to the degree of risk aversion and
its intercept is the average risk equal to Θ/2. So increasing risk aversion
reduces the equilibrium premium. It can be seen from the ￿gure that insur-
ance is only taken by those with high risks, namely θ ≥ Θ
1+2α.T h i sr e ￿ects
the process of (partial) market unravelling through which only a fraction of
the potential customers are actually served in equilibrium. The level of the
premium is too high for the low risks (i.e., θ < Θ
1+2α)t o￿nd it worthwhile
6For a uniform distribution of risk, E
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6to take out the insurance. Since the equilibrium premium is decreasing with
risk aversion, the number of those who opt out also decreases with risk aver-
sion. On the other hand the market will completely unravel if individuals
are risk neutral since the equilibrium premium is then equal to Θ.
[insert ￿gure 1 about here]
This market unravelling is a consequence of the fact that insurance com-
panies cannot distinguish low-risk from high-risk consumers and when they
oﬀer the same premium to all consumers, the high-risk consumers force the
premium up and this drives the low-risk out of the market. Of course, chang-
ing the distribution of risk will change the shape of E(θ : π(θ) ≥ π) and
so the equilibrium premium. In fact, it is possible to conceive distribution
functions F(θ) that lead to multiple equilibria in the sense that the curve
E(θ : π(θ) ≥ π) crosses the 45◦ line several times. At the low intersection
point, the premium is low because a large fraction of the population is cov-
ered. At the high intersection point, the premium is high because only the
small fraction of high-risk consumers take out the insurance. The important
point is that whatever the equilibrium, the lowest risk individuals will always
opt out (since π(0) = 0) forcing the equilibrium premium above the average
risk in the population (π∗ > θ). In this situation where adverse selection
unravels the market, compulsory insurance based on average risk can make
most consumers better oﬀ and thus be chosen by majority voting. The ben-
e￿t of a compulsory insurance is that it can always force the lowest risk to
participate lowering the equilibrium premium. In fact the equilibrium pre-
mium of a public (compulsory) insurance is π◦ = θ. Because of the inevitable
partial unravelling of a private (voluntary) insurance policy that oﬀers the
same premium to all consumers, we have that θ <E (θ : π
1+α ≤ θ ≤ Θ) and
7thus for any equilibrium on the private market π◦ < π∗.7
We can now compare the payoﬀ individuals get with either a full coverage
private insurance or public insurance. At the risk of excessive simpli￿cation,
we identify payoﬀ as the diﬀerence between the premium a consumer is willing
to pay given her risk (i.e., the value of insurance) less the premium eﬀectively
paid (i.e., the cost of insurance). Formally, the payoﬀ of an individual with
type θ and a private insurance policy with equilibrium premium π∗ is
V (π
∗;θ)=Max{0,(1 + α)θ − π
∗}
The payoﬀ of an individual with type θ and a public insurance policy
with equilibrium premium π◦ = θ is
V (π
◦;θ)=( 1+α)θ − π
◦
Therefore since π∗ > π◦ = θ we have
V (π
∗;θ) ≥ V (π





◦;θ) for θ >
θ
1+α
Thus all the high-risk individuals with θ ≥ θ
1+α prefer public insurance while
all the low-risk individuals with θ < θ
1+α prefer private insurance. Hence we
get the following result.
Proposition 1: (No screening) Suppose that (risk neutral and compet-
itive) private companies oﬀe rt h es a m ei n s u r a n c ep o l i c yt oa l lc o n s u m e r s ,
and that each individual degree of risk aversion is α > 0,t h e nam a j o r i t y
7In particular for the uniform distribution, we have π◦ = 1
2Θ < 1+α
1+2αΘ = π∗.
8of individuals prefer public (compulsory) to private (voluntary) insurance if
and only if θm ≥ θ
1+α.
Notice that this result holds true even for some positively skewed dis-
tributions of risk (θm < θ) leading the median to subsidise the high risk in
the public insurance. Notice also that the political support for the public
insurance increases with risk aversion. The reason is simple. All those par-
ticipating in the private insurance market prefer a public insurance to bene￿t
from a lower premium. Only those who opt out are worse oﬀ with a public
insurance. More risk aversion induces more consumers to participate on the
private insurance market and fewer to opt out, leading to a greater support
for public insurance.
This ￿nding is of course a consequence of the partial unravelling resulting
from a voluntary participation in the private insurance market when insur-
ance companies oﬀer the same policy to all consumers. We know introduce
the possibility for the insurance companies to oﬀer diﬀerent insurance policies
to diﬀerent consumers.
3 Private insurance with screening
We continue to assume a continuum of risk θ distributed on [0,Θ] according
to the distribution function F(θ). The insurance companies oﬀer a menu of
insurance policies {δ(θ),π(θ)}θ∈[0,Θ],w h e r eδ(θ) ∈ [0,1] is the coverage rate
and π(θ) is the premium intended for a consumer with risk θ. In a fully
separating equilibrium, each type θ selects the policy intended for her and
the premium is actuarially fair π(θ)=δ(θ)θ. This requires to satisfy the
following set of incentive compatibility constraints: For all θ ∈ [0,Θ] and for
all ￿ θ ∈ [0,Θ] with ￿ θ 6= θ,
9V (δ(θ),π(θ);θ)=( 1 + α)δ(θ)θ − π(θ) ≥
V (δ(b θ),π(b θ);θ)=( 1 + α)δ(b θ)θ − π(b θ)
or given the actuarially fair premia,
V (δ(θ),π(θ);θ)=( 1 + α)δ(θ)θ − δ(θ)θ ≥
V (δ(b θ),π(b θ);θ)=( 1 + α)δ(b θ)θ − δ(b θ)b θ
To see whether there exists a separating equilibrium in the model, we fol-
low the incentive compatibility approach of Mailath (1987). A necessary
condition for a separating equilibrium is that the following local incentive
compatibility conditions hold: for all θ ∈ [0,Θ]
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In other words, any separating equilibrium requires that no type be able
to obtain a strictly higher payoﬀ by announcing another arbitrary close type.
From Mailath (1987), we also see that the payoﬀ functions are such that these
local necessay conditions are also suﬃcient. Hence the equilibrium coverage
















where C is a constant of integration. Using the terminal condition δ(Θ)=1















Hence the policy menu {δ
∗(θ),π∗(θ)}θ∈[0,Θ] characterizes the unique sepa-
rating equilibrium in this continuous-type insurance model. Substituting the
equilibrium insurance policies into the payoﬀ functions we get
V (δ
∗(θ),π












The public insurance policy charges a uniform premium based on average risk
and imposes full coverage. So the payoﬀ functions for the public insurance are
exactly the same as in the previous section. We can now derive the marginal
type θ = θ
◦ who is indiﬀerent between the public and the private insurance
11policies. Obviously all low-risk consumers with θ < θ
◦ will prefer the private
separating insurance policy and all high-risk consumers with θ ≥ θ
◦ will






1/α)=θ − θ (4)
Since the LHS is always positive, the marginal type θ
◦ must be less than the
average θ. Unfortunately it is not possible to obtain an explicit solution for
θ
◦. Numerical solutions for θ
◦ are given in Table 1 for various levels of risk
aversion and average risk. Table 1 reveals that for any given the average risk,
the marginal type is decreasing with risk aversion and thus that the political
support for public insurance over private separating insurance increases with
risk aversion (as in the previous section). Moreover Table 1 shows that the
marginal type is signi￿cantly below the average type so that even for some
positively skewed distributions of risk, a majority will support full public
insurance over private separating insurance.
[insert Table 1 about here]
The following proposition summarizes our result with private separating
insurance policies.
Proposition 2: (Screening) Suppose that (risk neutral and competitive)
private companies oﬀer fully separating insurance policies in equilibrium to
all consumers, and that the public insurance contract is the same for all con-
sumers, then there exists a critical risk level 0 < θ
◦ < θ such that a majority
of consumers prefer the public insurance if and only if θm ≥ θ
◦. Moreover θ
◦
i sd e c r e a s i n gw i t ht h ed e g r e eo fr i s ka v e r s i o n ,α.
We emphasize that this Proposition is general and does not depend on the
12distribution of risk in the population. More risk aversion increases the po-
litical support for public insurance because the adverse selection problem
induces the private insurance companies to provide only partial coverage to
low risk individuals. So a greater risk aversion reduces the attractiveness of
private insurance and leads more individuals to favour public insurance with
full coverage (although at a higher price for the low risk).
4T o p - u p i n s u r a n c e
.
In this section we introduce the possibility of mixing public and private
insurance. A basic result in the expected utility framework is that a mixed
insurance can make both the low risk and the high risk individuals better oﬀ
(e.g. Eckstein et al, 1985). The reason is that partial public insurance op-
erates a cross-subsidy from the low-risk to the high risk thereby relaxing the
incentive constraint on the private insurance market. Figure 2a illustrates
this result for two risk types (assuming low risk individuals are in a major-
ity). It shows that even if the low risk individuals do not favour full public
insurance, they may prefer a mixed insurance to the pure private system.
We show there cannot be a majority for such a mixture of private and public
insurance under the dual theory of risk aversion. Our analysis thus suggests
that the political support for a mixed system of insurance rests heavily on the
modelling of choice under uncertainty. At one extreme the expected utility
theory is the most favorable to mixing public and private insurance while at
the other extreme the dual theory tends to favour separation between private
and public insurance.
Let δ ∈ [0,1] and π = δθ be the public insurance policy. Individuals can
freely complement this public insurance with a private insurance leading to
a total coverage for type θ equal to δ(θ) where the extra private coverage
13δ(θ) − δ is purchased at a fair price (δ(θ) − δ)θ and satis￿es the incentive
constraints. The corresponding payoﬀ functions are,
V (δ,δ(θ),π(θ);θ)=( 1 + α)δθ − δθ +( 1+α)(δ(θ) − δ)θ − (δ(θ) − δ)θ
= δ(θ − θ)+αδ(θ)θ
In any separating equilibrium, the following necessary local incentive com-
patibility condition must hold: for all θ ∈ [0,Θ]
"




=( 1 + α)δ
0(θ)θ − δ
0(θ)θ − (δ(θ) − δ)=0
= αθδ
0(θ) − (δ(θ) − δ)=0
.
From Mailath(1987), it is easily seen that the payoﬀ functions are such
that the local incentive compatibility condition is also suﬃcient, implying
that the solution to the equation above charaterizes the separating equilib-
rium for the continuum-type case. Hence the separating equilibrium coverage









































14where C(δ) is the constant of integration given the public coverage rate. Set-
ting δ(Θ)=1for a Pareto optimal equilibrium, we get C(δ)=( 1−δ)Θ−1/α.








Θ)1/α < 1 represents the inherent partial coverage resulting from the
adverse selection problem on the private insurance market. In particular,
setting δ =0we get the same expression for δ
∗(θ) as in the previous section.
Notice that in equilibrium, for all types total coverage is increasing with the
public coverage rate δ since ( θ
Θ)1/α < 1.













θ + δ(θ − θ)
We are now in a position to determine the equilibrium level of public












Interestingly, this expression is independent of δ. Moreover it is easily
seen that there exists a marginal type θ
◦ < θ who is indiﬀerent to a change
in the public coverage rate δ. Notice that this marginal type is the same as
in the previous section where public coverage was set equal to one.8 This
8Therefore, the value of the marginal type as a function of α and θ is the same as
i n d i c a t e di nT a b l e1 .
15is because the preference for public coverage is independent of the level of
public coverage. Finally, notice that all those with risk θ < θ
◦prefer no public
coverage and all those with risk θ ≥ θ
◦ prefer full public coverage. Therefore
either the median risk is below θ
◦ and the political equilibrium involves no
public insurance at all, or alternatively the median risk is above θ
◦and the
political equilibrium involves full public insurance. It follows that a mixed
system is not politically sustainable. We summarize our results in the fol-
lowing proposition.
Proposition 3: (Policy mix) Suppose that (risk neutral and competitive)
private companies oﬀer fully separating insurance policies in equilibrium to
all consumers to complement a public insurance contract which is the same
for all consumers, then there exists a critical risk level 0 < θ
◦ < θ such that
a majority of consumers prefer a full public insurance if and only if θm ≥ θ
◦
and no public insurance at all otherwise. A mixture of public and private
insurance is not politically sustainable. Moreover since θ
◦is decreasing with
t h ed e g r e eo fr i s ka v e r s i o n( α), the political support for a full public insurance
increases with risk aversion.
The dual theory, because of its linearity property, tends to produce corner
solutions in optimization problems. This is why we get either full public
insurance or pure private insurance. Figure 2 illustrates why a mixed system
is more likely under expected utility than within the dual theory.9
[Insert ￿gure 2 about here]
Although such corner solutions may look awkward, their comparative
statics properties are intuitive. Recall that under dual theory,a majority
9I am indebted to one anonymous referee for suggesting me this graphical comparison.
16prefer public insurance if θm ≥ θ
◦ and private insurance if θm < θ
◦.The
parameter θ
◦ therefore acts as a measure of the collective preference for public
insurance: with a decrease in θ
◦ tending to encourage public insurance and an
increase in θ
◦ tending to inhibit public insurance. Thus it is of interest to see
how θ
◦ is aﬀected by the underlying parameters of the model. From (4) we
note that θ
◦ depends on one hand on risk aversion α and on the other hand
on the average risk θ. Increasing risk aversion, as we might expect, makes
the better coverage of public insurance more appealing and thus raises the
political support for private insurance. Increasing the average risk raises the
price of public insurance making public insurance relatively less attractive.
The result that there cannot be a majority support for a mixed system
is not to be taken as a general feature of the dual theory. It is easy to think
of a more complex model in which corner solutions no longer prevail. This
is for instance the case in the multivariate version of the theory (see Yaari,
1986). As we show in Appendix B a mixed system can also prevail if we
introduce a slight distortion in public insurance.10Moreover it is shown that
the equilibrium degree of public insurance is increasing with risk aversion
and the median risk but decreasing with average risk and the intensity of the
distortion.
5 Testing for risk and the demand for public
insurance
In this section we show how the recent progress in the information technology
that improves the capacity of private insurance companies to infer individual
risks will aﬀect the demand for public insurance (for a survey on the eﬀects of
10Indeed, one might expect that compulsory public insurance is more amenable to dis-
tortion than voluntary private insurance.
17genetic screening, see Barr, forthcoming ). Suppose that private companies
have access to some genetic tests that reveal the true risk of any individual
with probability s ∈ [0,1] and reveal nothing at all with probability 1−s.S o
s is a measure of the quality of the information available to private compa-
nies in using this technology. We assume that if the test is successfull private
companies oﬀer a contract with actuarially fair premium and full coverage
giving a payoﬀ (1 + α) − θ to an individual with risk θ, otherwise they of-
fer an incentive compatible contract such as described in Section 3 giving
ap a y o ﬀ as in (3). So the expected payoﬀ for an individual with risk θ re-
sulting from this private insurance policy contingent on a test of quality s is11
EV(δ
∗(θ),π





The payoﬀ resulting from the public insurance policy is unchanged by the
introduction of this test. Comparing both payoﬀ we can derive the individual
with risk θ = θ
◦
s who is indiﬀerent between both systems. This is given by
the solution to




1/α)] = θ − θ
It is easily seen that the solution of this equation, θ
◦
s,i si n c r e a s i n gi nt h e
quality of the test s and tends to θ when s approaches s =1 .S i n c ea l lt h o s e
with risk θ ≥ θ
◦
s prefer public insurance, it turns out that the demand for
public insurance decreases as the quality of the test improves. We state this
result in the next proposition.
11To be more precise this expected payoﬀ should be de￿ated by a risk premium to
re￿ect the risk associated to the imperfection of the test. However this will complicate the
analysis without bringing more insights and we prefer to ignore it
18Proposition 4: (testing) Suppose that (risk neutral and competitive)
private companies oﬀer fully separating insurance policies in equilibrium to
every consumer whose risk has not been revealed by the test (with probability
(1−s)), and a full coverage at actuarially fair price to every consumer whose
risk has been revealed by the test (with probability s). If the public insurance
contract is the same for all consumers, then there exists a critical risk level
0 < θ
◦
s ≤ θ such that a majority of consumers prefer the public insurance




s is decreasing with the degree of risk
aversion, α and increasing with the quality of the test s.
The main implication of Proposition 4 is that the demand for public
insurance decreases with the increasing capacity of private companies in as-
sessing individual risks up to a point where public insurance may no longer
be politically sustainable.
6C o n c l u s i o n
In this paper we have derived the circumstances under which a majority
prefers public insurance over private insurance in the presence of adverse
selection problem. The main results are that there is in general a majority
support for public insurance and that our non-expected utility framework
(risk aversion without diminishing marginal utility) is less favourable to mix-
ing private and public insurance than the expected utility setting. This seems
to be consistent with aspects observed in the real world. For example health
care is mostly provided by government in many countries. We have also
shown that the demand for public insurance increases with risk aversion and
d e c r e a s e sw i t ht h eq u a l i t yo ft h et e s t su s e db yp r i v a t ec o m p a n i e st oa s s e s s
individual risks.
19The results are of course illustrative and not conclusive, but still they are
instructive. The limitations of our analysis need to be emphasized. First
we have not considered the moral hazard problem. Second we have ignored
the important agency problem. This agency problem is specially acute in
health care where the insured and uninformed patient cannot monitor the
prescribing agent who does not bear the cost of prescribtion but on the con-
trary may bene￿t from over-prescibtion. The nature of the moral hazard
and agency problem is the same for a private insurer as for a public insurer.
To do justice to these crucial problems would deserve a separate paper, but
would probably not aﬀect our results about the relative preference for public
and private insurance. The third and perhaps most important limitation
of our analysis is the absence of distributive argument for public insurance.
The reason was to isolate the insurance motive for public insurance and show
that public insurance can be supported by a majority without resorting to
distributive motive. However we agree that most systems of health care and
state pensions in the European Union currently include a potential amount of
income redistribution by the mere fact that contributions are income-related.
We to take up this issue in a separate paper in which individuals diﬀer not
only in their risk but also in their income (De donder and Hindriks, 2000).
The model is similar to Rochet (1991) or Cremer and Pestieau (1996) with
the diﬀerence that we use the non-expected utility framework and majority
voting. The key question is of course how the the degree of redistribution
of public insurance and the correlation between income and risk aﬀect the
political equilibrium outcome.
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7 Appendix
Appendix A: Reservation premium in the dual theory
Let X be a random variable with the cumulative distribution function
F(x) on [x,x] and let U(X) be the utility assigned to X under the dual





where G(x)=1− F(x) is the decumulative distribution function (with
G(x)=1and G(x)=0 )a n dφ
0(.) are non-negative weigths adding up
to 1.Risk aversion is characterized by the convexity of φ.I f φ is convex
then bad outcomes (with high G(x)) receives relatively high weights whereas
good outcomes (with low G(x)) receive relatively low weights. So, U(X) is
the certainty equivalent of X de￿ned as the mean in which probabilities of
bad outcomes are increased and probabilities of good outcomes are decreased.
Since U is linear in x, attitude towards risk is separated from attitude towards
wealth. We can now apply this dual theory in our simple two-state of nature
insurance framework. For an individual with income w>1 facing a damage
d =1with probability θ ∈ [0,Θ] (with Θ < 1), insurance contract with
premium π ≥ 0 and coverage rate δ ∈ [0,1] yields the random variable
X =( w−π−(1−δ),θ;w−π;1−θ) whereas no insurance yields the random
variable X0 =( w−1,θ;w;1−θ). Under Yaari￿s Dual theory , the reservation
premium π = π(θ) is de￿ned by
U(X)=φ(θ)[w − π − (1 − δ)] + (1 − φ(θ))[w − π]=
21U(X0)=φ(θ)[w − 1] + (1 − φ(θ))[w]
where risk aversion is represented by φ(θ) > θ (and 1−φ(θ) < 1−θ). Letting
φ(θ)=( 1+α)θ (where α ≥ 0 denotes the degree of risk aversion) and
rearranging the above expression we get the following reservation premium.
π(θ)=( 1+α)θδ
where 0 ≤ α ≤ 1−Θ
Θ (the upper bound guarantees that φ(θ) ≤ 1 ∀
θ ∈ [0,Θ] ).
Appendix B: Policy mix with distortionary public insurance
Let us consider, for example, that the public insurance premium for any




where the deadweight loss is proportional to ￿δ
2 ≥ 0. (Recall that the dead-
weight loss from taxation is approximately proportional to the square of the
tax rate.) The parameter ￿ ≥ 0 measures the intensity of the deadweight
loss, with non-distortionary public insurance if ￿ =0 . It is easily seen that
the equilibrium on the private market is unaﬀected by the deadweight loss of
public insurance (i.e., δ
∗(θ)=( 1−δ)(θm
Θ )1/α +δ). It follows that the payoﬀ




∗(θ)θ + δ(θ − π
◦
￿)




1/α + δ]+δ(θ − θ) − ￿δ
2θ
which is strictly concave in δ for any ￿>0.Therefore the deadweight loss
from public insurance tends to produce interior solutions for the individually
22optimal degree of public insurance. Moreover all individual have single-
peaked preferences over public coverage δ and the high risk individuals prefers
more public insurance than the low risk individuals. By the median voter
theorem, the majority voting outcome is characterized by the degree of public
insurance that is optimal for the median risk individual θ = θm.F r o m t h e
￿rst-order condition for the median voter
∂V￿(.;θm)
∂δ




1/α)+( θm − θ) − 2￿δθ ≤ 0
with strict equality for δ > 0. Solving we get




Θ )1/α)+( θm − θ)
2￿θ
if θm > θ
◦and ￿>￿
◦
δm =1 if θm > θ
◦and ￿ ≤ ￿
◦
where θ





￿◦ ≥ 0 for all θm ≥ θ
◦). Therefore the majority voting outcome involves a
mixed system (0 < δm < 1 ) if (i) the median risk is high enough (making
some public insurance desirable to all those above the median risk) and (ii)
the deadweight loss increases at a suﬃciently high rate with public coverage
(making full public insurance non-desirable to all those below the median
risk). The comparative statics properties of the interior solution are the
following. Increased risk aversion increases the degree of public coverage
(∂δm/∂α > 0). The reason is that a more risk averse median voter is more
sensitive to the fact that public insurance can oﬀer a better coverage than
private insurance. Increasing the median risk leads to more public insurance
(∂δm/∂θm > 0) while increasing the average risk increases the price of public
insurance and leads to less public insurance ( ∂δm/∂θ < 0). Lastly the higher
the deadweight loss, the lower the demand for public insurance (∂δm/∂￿<0).
To sum up
23Proposition 3*: (Policy mix with distortion) When public insurance is
distortionary and the deadweight loss increases suﬃc i e n t l yr a p i d l yw i t hp u b l i c
coverage, then the majority voting outcome involves partial public insurance
if θm ≥ θ
◦ and no public insurance at all otherwise. In the mixed system,
the equilibrium degree of public insurance is an increasing function of risk
aversion and median risk, and a decreasing function of deadweight loss and
average risk.
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26Figure 1   Partial market unravelling with uniform distribution of risk
      1
E(θ: π(θ)≥π)
                              1/2
 45°
                0  π*=(1+α)/(1+2α)        π(1)               πTable 1. Critical risk level θ° as a function of risk aversion α and average risk.
      α                                      Average risk
0.25 0.33 0.5 0.66 0.75
0.25 0.2 0.27 0.4 0.54 0.62
0.33 0.19 0.25 0.38 0.52 0.6
0.5 0.17 0.23 0.35 0.48 0.56
0.66 0.15 0.21 0.32 0.46 0.53
0.75 0.14 0.2 0.31 0.45 0.52
1 0.13 0.18 0.29 0.42 0.5
1.33 0.12 0.17 0.27 0.4 0.48
1.5 0.11 0.16 0.27 0.39 0.47
1.66 0.11 0.16 0.26 0.39 0.46
1.75 0.11 0.15 0.26 0.38 0.46
2 0.1 0.15 0.25 0.37 0.45
3 0.09 0.14 0.23 0.36 0.43
4 0.09 0.13 0.22 0.34 0.42
5 0.08 0.12 0.21 0.33 0.41       CH                        CH
ππ
       C￿    C￿
   CP
       CP
          C￿
       C￿
               CL
        CL
     1        δ     δ
   a.  expected utility theory b.  dual theory
Figure 2. Mixed insurance in two-type model. (a) expected utility theory: the separating
equilibrium without public insurance is given by contract CL for the low risk type and CH for the high
risk type (both contracts break even and are incentive compatible).  A pure public insurance system is
given by a full coverage contract CP with average risk premium. With a majority of low risk types full
public insurance cannot be a majority voting outcome. However there is a unanimous support for a
mixture of public and private insurance leading to either C￿ for the low risks (who prefer C￿ to CL)  or
C￿ for the high risks (who prefer C￿ to CH). (b) dual theory: the indifference curves are linear which
implies that if low risks are indifferent between pure private insurance CL and full public insurance CP,
then they are also indifferent between any mixture of public and private insurance.This working paper has been produced by
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